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ABSTRACT
Many European countries have been the target of jihadist terrorist
attacks between 2015 and 2017. While the chance of becoming a
victim of a terrorist attack is low, terrorism scholars have emphasized
that terrorism does not revolve around statistics and casualty num-
bers. Terrorists use attacks to reach an audience and aﬀect groups
beyond the direct victims. To this date, little is known about how
terrorist attacks might aﬀect the salience of terrorism beyond
national borders. This paper investigates possible convergence of
issue salience of terrorism among citizens within the European
Union for ten jihadist attacks in the period 2015–2017 using
Eurobarometer survey data. The results indicate that it is not simply
a question of convergence or divergence of salience of terrorism after
a terrorist attack. The connection is multidirectional and depending
upon a variety of factors. Most importantly, we observed conver-
gence on the EU-level, but divergence on the national level. This
raises important questions about the transnationality of the eﬀects of
terrorism. As this research does not test nor ﬁnd a causal mechanism
and is solely dependent on existing data, further research is neces-
sary to test some of its ﬁndings.
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Introduction
Over the past years, jihadist terrorists have targeted several European countries. Well-
known examples are the attacks in Paris (January and November 2015), Brussels (2016),
Nice (2016), Manchester (2017) and Barcelona (2017). These attacks aligned with the rise
of the so-called Islamic State (IS) and have made headlines worldwide as well as led to
policy changes within the aﬀected countries.1
Statistically speaking, the risk of an individual being killed because of a terrorist attack
in Europe is close to zero. According to the “European Union Terrorism Situation and
Trend Reports” of Europol, terrorist attacks led to the death of 151 people in 2015, 142
people in 2016 and sixty-eight people in 2017.2 On a total population of 511 million within
the EU, this is a rate of about 0.7 to 1 million over those three years.3 Thus, the probability
that an individual becomes a victim of a terrorist attack is very low.4
The risk of terrorist attacks in Europe, however, has manifested itself as being a lot
more than a mere statistical possibility. Terrorism does not revolve around statistics such
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as casualty numbers and the risk of being killed: many terrorism researchers have
emphasized that terrorism fundamentally is about reaching an audience beyond the direct
victims and using terrorist attacks to send a message.5 Media coverage of a terrorist attack
helps terrorists to spread this message.6 The large-scale terrorist attacks that occurred in
the period 2015–2017 in the European Union made headlines for days across countries,
reaching a wide audience. Some authors have thus called terrorism a low-probability,
high-impact threat.7 To this date, however, there hardly exists any literature that investi-
gates how these terrorist attacks could aﬀect the salience of terrorism and thereby both
inﬂuence public opinion as well as policy agenda's.
This idea can be broadly deﬁned as issue salience: the importance citizens assign to an
issue. This paper will look at the salience of terrorism within the European Union in the
years 2015–2017. It aims to see to what extent there is convergence or divergence in the
salience of terrorism as an issue among citizens of diﬀerent EU member states in this
period. To this end, we will use the data of the Eurobarometer. The Eurobarometer is a
series of opinion surveys carried out for the European Commission since 1973.8 The
period that will be studied is 2015–2017 when European countries were confronted with
several large-scale terrorist attacks. The attacks and concurrent possible changes in issue
salience around this time will be studied for jihadist attacks in which the perpetrators
killed at least ﬁve people. These ten attacks are attacks in Paris in January and November
2015, Brussels in March 2016, Nice in July 2016, Berlin in December 2016, London in
March and June 2017, Stockholm in April 2017, Manchester in May 2017 and Barcelona
in August 2017.9 The central question of this paper is: to what extent do we see the same
(relative and absolute) change in the salience of terrorism in countries that are attacked as
compared to the average within the EU?
By studying the salience of terrorism, this study aims to take the ﬁrst step toward a
better understanding of how the eﬀects of terrorism might cross national borders. This
paper tries to address an important gap in the literature on the impact of terrorism. While
several scholars have emphasized the importance of the audience of terrorism, very few
attempts have been made to gauge the extent to which attacks aﬀect the salience of
terrorism among an important audience group: the wider population. An exception is
the 2006 study by Bakker into threat perceptions within the EU, which concluded that
“the threat is not pan-European.”10 This study builds on Bakker’s important contribution
and wishes to update it to the current period in which Europe has been confronted, again,
with several jihadist attacks. It aims to broaden Bakker’s design as he studied the overall
development of the salience of terrorism within the EU but did not investigate possible
diﬀerences between countries of attack and the EU average before and after particular
terrorist attacks. Furthermore, whereas Bakker used Eurobarometer data (2003–2005) on
the most important issues on a national level, we argue that, in addition, we also need to
see how citizens rank terrorism as an issue to the European Union to understand how the
eﬀects of terrorism might cross borders.
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, after deﬁning issue salience, the theoretical
framework will discuss key concepts related to expected convergence or divergence in the
salience of terrorism after terrorist attacks. These include media attention, transnational-
ism, shared identity and a lack of transnationalism. The methods section will outline how
the Eurobarometer is used to study the salience of terrorism. The results section will
present the data, which will be followed by a discussion on how these results should be
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interpreted in light of convergence or divergence within the European Union and the
impact of terrorist attacks.
Theoretical framework
Before delving into the empirical data on issue salience, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne issue
salience in the context of terrorism.
Issue salience
There exists a wide variety of deﬁnitions of issue salience; there is not one, clear deﬁnition
of this concept. According to an in-depth study on the use of issue salience, the majority
(62 percent) of the articles provided no deﬁnition of the term at all. Others deﬁned salient
policy issues as issues prominent in the minds of citizens. Then again, others pointed
toward the level of importance given to an issue.11 For example, Beyers, Dür and Wonka
assume that issue salience is the importance the public attribute to a political matter.12
Warntjen deﬁnes salience as “the importance an actor attaches to an issue.”13 For this
research, we will deﬁne issue salience as issues that are ranked among the most important
issues according to European citizens.
Another question relates to how to measure the level of salience. Here too, a myriad of
methods is possible. Some scholars looked at the political elites or news media, whereas
others focused on voting behavior.14 Yet again, other scholars studied the importance
citizens placed on the issue, which is the most common measurement.15 This type of
measurement can be carried out in two diﬀerent ways: the ﬁrst focuses on the importance
citizens place on the issue for the country or community as a whole, whereas the second
focuses on the importance a citizen places on the issue personally.16 For this paper, we will
use the ﬁrst type of measurement, as the importance citizens place on the issue for their
country and community (the EU) is measured by the Eurobarometer and most clearly
aligns with the research objectives of this paper.
Convergence
Media attention
The news of a terrorist attack transcends borders and shows the transnational impact of
these attacks. This means both the phenomenon of terrorism and the impact are transna-
tional. Several studies have found a clear relationship between media coverage and the
salience of issues for citizens. An example is the study by Wanta, Golan and Lee on the
relationship between media coverage and the way in which Americans viewed foreign
nations.17 The authors found that the top two countries on the public agenda received the
highest media coverage. Additionally, the countries that received the lowest media cover-
age were also at the bottom of the public agenda.18 Thus, it could be argued that when
events such as terrorist attacks receive a lot of news coverage, the issue is placed higher on
the public agenda and is more likely to become a salient issue. Consequently, we believe
that terrorist attacks such as the ones included in this study increase issue salience as they
receive a lot of media attention. This eﬀect will be visible in the Eurobarometer data.
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Nellis and Savage explored the eﬀect of media exposure related to terrorism fear in the
United States, drawing upon earlier research from fear of crime literature. They found that
“frequency of exposure [to TV news] was associated with greater fear for one’s family,
greater personal perceived risk of terrorism and greater risk of terrorism to others.”19 It
stands to reason that this eﬀect is mirrored by media coverage on terrorism and issue
salience. Parker et al. found that press coverage of terrorist attacks can shape the reaction
of the public. They found that “press reporting in both countries [the UK and Denmark]
frequently frames lone-actor terrorism as a signiﬁcant and increasing problem.”20
However, they also found that the type of media coverage is important. Many of the
articles in their dataset do not report details of terrorist messaging, which, according to
them, counters the role of the media in acting as a “force-multiplier for terrorist
campaigns.”21 This means that the content of media coverage matters as well: the media
could aﬀect the response of the audience and therefore amplify issue salience of terrorism
on the public agenda, depending on the type of coverage.
To understand how media coverage might aﬀect issue salience, Birkland has pointed at
so-called “focusing events.” He deﬁned these as “an event that is sudden, relatively rare,
can be reasonably deﬁned as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater
future harms, inﬂicts harms or suggest potential harms that are or could be concentrated
on a deﬁnable geographical area or community of interest, and that is known to policy-
makers and the public virtually simultaneously.”22 A focusing event often gains wide-
spread attention due to the nature of this event.23 A terrorist attack can be regarded as a
focusing event since they often occur suddenly and are relatively rare. Additionally, the
inherent violent nature of a terrorist attack is aimed at inﬂicting harm, and due to the
immediate and abundant media coverage following a terrorist attack, the occurrence of
such an attack is known to policymakers and the public at the same time.
Transnationalism
Terrorist attacks might increase the salience of terrorism across European countries as
citizens know that terrorism is a transnational phenomenon that crosses national borders.24
Over 42,000 foreign ﬁghters from more than 120 countries have joined jihadist groups in
Syria and Iraq since 2011.25 Terrorist organizations such as IS frequently threaten entire
regions in their propaganda. A pro-IS media group released a video after the Brussels attacks
of March 2016, in which it was stated that “[i]f it was Paris yesterday, and today in Brussels,
Allah knows where it will be tomorrow. Maybe it will be in London or Berlin or Rome. We
will come to you and terrify you everywhere… .”26 The goal is to send the message that such
an attack could happen anywhere and that there is no diﬀerence for jihadists between
European countries. In the past years, terrorists directly instructed or inspired by IS have
indeed targeted various European countries.
Secondly, the idea of a transnational threat could also be strengthened because the EU
as such can be regarded to be a transnational community. In practical terms, the Schengen
Agreement and freedom of movement of citizens enables terrorists to cross borders
relatively easily and, on paper, to attack almost anywhere within the EU.27 In more
theoretical terms, scholars have investigated the question to what extent the EU can be
seen as something more ideological, often phrased as a “community of values.”28 This is
another factor that could contribute to convergence: a feeling of solidarity due to belong-
ing to a community of shared values.
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Shared identity
Looking at the aftermath of terrorist attacks within Europe, terrorist attacks often inspire
solidarity across various countries with the targeted country, at least when looking at
outward appearances. We have seen many recent examples ranging from “Je Suis Charlie”
after the attacks on the oﬃces of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and world leaders holding
hands on the streets of Paris to the hype of Facebook users covering their proﬁle pictures
with an image of the French ﬂag after the November 2015 Paris attacks. The question is,
however, to what extent such public manifestations of solidarity can be equated to actual
identiﬁcation with the victims, leading to increased threat perceptions as well as an
increase in the salience of terrorism as an issue.
According to Liem, Kuipers and Sciarone, the reason why terrorist attacks in one
European country aﬀect other European countries is because the attack is not just an
attack on one country, or the victims of an attack, but it serves as a greater message to a
system of shared values and a community as a whole.29 The authors also showed that
more people in the Netherlands searched for terrorism-related terms on Google after a
terrorist attack abroad.30 Although this paper was solely focused on the eﬀects in the
Netherlands, it stands to reason that these eﬀects are similar in other European countries
and that the salience of terrorism thus increases after an attack. This could be related to
feelings of a shared identity within the EU. Scholars have found that these feelings are
present in the EU. Delanty suggests that there are signs that a collective identity exists
within the EU, speciﬁcally related to the cultural and political identity of the EU.31 This is
consonant with Eurobarometer data from the Eurobarometer 40-year public opinion
survey.32 The data from this survey showed that most people within the EU view
themselves as European. The majority of the people within the EU feel that they are
European in some way every time this question has been asked, since 1992.33 However,
according to the same research, this varies from country to country.
Divergence
Lack of transnationalism
Divergence could be related to the fact that the threat of terrorism in general and terrorist
attacks in particular remain very local, contained events. Although jihadist terrorists have
a transnational agenda, they often focus on particular countries. For instance, according to
data of Europol, there were a total of 705 arrests related to jihadism in 2017. Of these
arrests, 373 were made in France, seventy-eight in Spain, ﬁfty-two in Germany, ﬁfty in
Belgium and forty-six in Austria.34 This means that around 85 percent of the arrests,
reﬂecting the intensity of jihadist activity, were made in just ﬁve countries. Additionally,
almost all jihadist terrorist attacks have taken place in Western and Northern Europe.
Many countries in the Eastern or Southern part of Europe are less confronted with the
issues of, for instance, foreign ﬁghters or homegrown jihadist networks. Clearly, the threat
of terrorism is not the same in diﬀerent regions within the European Union, as was also
observed by Bakker in his 2006 study.35 A small number of countries are targeted
frequently, but most European countries, fortunately, have not been targeted by jihadist
attacks. Therefore, it could be expected that citizens in those parts of Europe that are not
regularly confronted with (jihadist) terrorism would have a diﬀerent interpretation of the
salience of terrorism and would be less aﬀected by the occurrence of terrorist attacks in
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 5
other parts of Europe. This would mean that a possible change in issue salience within the
country of attack is not observed when looking at the European Union average, leading to
divergence in issue salience.
Furthermore, while we do see outward solidarity (in the form of statements from
European leaders or civilians) after terrorist attacks, this cannot be directly equated to
an increase in the salience of terrorism. After the attacks in France in 2015, many people
changed their Facebook proﬁle picture in support of the victims of the terrorist attacks.
While we do see some type of outward solidarity, there is no evidence so far that European
citizens of other countries truly identify themselves with the victims of an attack.
According to the Special Eurobarometer “Europeans in 2014,” the majority of European
citizens do not feel that the EU member states are close in terms of shared values. This
decline started in 2012 and was visible in 2014 as well.36 This does seem to contradict
earlier ﬁndings of signs of a collective identity within the EU.
According to Criado, a terrorist attack in itself is not suﬃcient to change terrorism
salience in public opinion.37 Criado analyzed this issue for Spain, a country that has been
confronted with terrorism for an extensive amount of time. She found that the target of a
terrorist attack, the ideology of a party in government, the closeness to the election and the
presence of an agreement to exclude terrorism from party competition all contribute to
terrorism salience.38 This means that there could be many other factors that contribute to
the salience of terrorism as an issue.
Methods
The data of the Eurobarometer is used to study the convergence or divergence of issue salience
of terrorism within the European Union. The Standard Eurobarometer (EB) is a survey
conducted by TNS Opinion & Social at the request of the European Commission,
Directorate-General for Communication. It is carried out every few months, usually within
a two-week period across the European Union. The number of respondents is around 1,000
per country. For the EU average score (EU28), the results of the diﬀerent countries are
weighed in the survey in proportion to their population size and population density.39
The survey questions that will be used for this study pertain to what people perceive as
the most important security issues, which we interpret as issue salience. Citizens are asked
three diﬀerent versions of the question: one pertaining to the most important security
issue for their own country (QA3 in the survey), one pertaining to the most important
security issues on a personal level (QA4), and one pertaining to the most important
security issue for the EU as a whole (QA5). The exact questions are:
● QA3 What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY)
at the moment? (ROTATE – MAX. 2 ANSWERS)
● QA4 And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the
moment? (ROTATE – MAX. 2 ANSWERS)
● QA5 What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the
moment? (ROTATE – MAX. 2 ANSWERS)
Respondents choose a maximum of two items from a rotating list of the following options:
crime, economic situation, rising prices/inﬂation, taxation, unemployment, terrorism,
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EU’s inﬂuence in the world, the state of member states public ﬁnances, immigration,
pensions, the environment, energy supply, climate change, other (SP.), none (SP.), DK
(don’t know). For this study, question QA3 and QA5 will be analyzed as this enables us to
study potential diﬀerences in the relative issue salience of terrorism on a national level and
the EU-level for diﬀerent EU countries.
The Standard Eurobarometers 82 (November 2014) to 88 (November 2017) will be used
as they align with the period of the studied jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe. The dates
in this study are the dates when the survey was conducted. The time between the ﬁrst EB
before and after an attack diﬀers on a case-by-case basis. For each terrorist attack, the
dates of the survey as well as the time before and after the terrorist attack will be provided.
First of all, the overall trend of issue salience of terrorism is shown on both the national
and EU-level, providing an overview of the development in the period November 2014–
November 2017. Then, for each of the ten studied terrorist attacks, the results of the last
EB that was conducted before and the ﬁrst EB that was conducted after the terrorist attack
will be compared. This will be performed for both Q3A and Q5A—comparing the issue
salience on national and European level. For both questions, the results will be presented
for the country where the terrorist attack took place as well as the EU28-average. For each
studied terrorist attack, one graph will be presented containing the results of the two
diﬀerent EBs for the country of attack and the EU average: the left-hand side of the graph
pertains to Q3A and on the right-hand side pertains to Q5A for the country of attack and
the EU average in the two EBs. A total of nine graphs are presented as two attacks occur in
the same country in the same period and are shown in one graph.
It must be noted that a causal link between terrorist attacks and the salience of
terrorism cannot be tested, since terrorist attacks are just one, albeit highly important,
factor that could aﬀect those perceptions. Secondly, since the Eurobarometer data focuses
on the salience of several security issues, the terrorist threat is relative to other security
threats (for example, crime, immigration or economics). Thirdly, the amount of time
between the polling dates of the Eurobarometer and the various jihadists attacks varies,
which complicates comparisons between those cases. Despite these shortcomings, the
Eurobarometer forms a unique source as it consistently tracks public opinion within the
EU over a longer period of time. As the Eurobarometer surveys citizens on security issues
twice a year, it is guaranteed that data is available at most a few months after each terrorist
attack. This research design enables us to develop our insight into the relative issue
salience of terrorism in the period before and after a terrorist attack and to see to what
extent convergence or divergence occurs within the EU.
Results
Overall development of issue salience of terrorism within the EU
Overall, there has been a steady increase in the salience of terrorism within the EU in this
period. This applies to the questions about national issue salience (Q3A) as well as EU
issue salience (Q5A). The results (see Figure 1) show that EU citizens on average rank
terrorism less of a national security issue than an EU security issue and the diﬀerence
between those two seems to have been expanding over the past years. Whereas the EU
average on national issue salience moved from 6 percent to a peak of 19 percent in May
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2017 and back to 16 percent in November 2017, the EU average on EU issue salience
moved from 11 percent to a peak of 44 percent in May 2017 and 38 percent in November
2017. This corresponds to the relative position of terrorism among the list of security
issues presented to respondents. For the EU average of national salience of terrorism,
terrorism never reached the top three of issues identiﬁed by respondents. On national
issue salience, issues such as unemployment, immigration and the economic situation
almost continuously ranked higher. The situation for EU issue salience is diﬀerent. In the
surveys from EB84 and onwards, terrorism has on average consistently ranked as the
second most frequently mentioned item of security issues for the EU as a whole. In EB85,
terrorism was ranked as the number one or two security concern to the EU in every
member state with the exception of Greece, where citizens ranked it third (after immigra-
tion and the economic situation). In EB86, only citizens in Greece, Finland and Sweden
ranked terrorism outside of the top three security concerns to the EU (on number four,
after immigration, the economic situation and public ﬁnances/rising inﬂation). For EB87,
with 44 percent of the respondents mentioning terrorism, terrorism was on average seen
as the most important security issue for the EU as a whole.
Development of issue salience after terrorist attacks
This section will show the results of the salience of terrorism on a national and EU level
before and after ten jihadist terrorist attacks.
Charlie Hebdo attacks
The results40 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the Charlie Hebdo
attacks and in January 2015 in France that killed seventeen people are displayed in
Figure 2. It shows a large increase in the national salience of terrorism (Q3A) within
the country of the attack—from 5 percent to 13 percent in France—whereas the EU
average of the national issue salience (the average of how European citizens perceived
terrorism as a security issue for their own country) hardly changed (from 6 percent to 7
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Figure 1. Results of EU average of salience of terrorism within the EU.
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percent). Concerning EU issue salience (Q5A), a similar substantial increase can be seen in
the country where the attack occurred (13 percent–19 percent) as compared to the EU
average (11 percent–17 percent). This means that whereas terrorism was ranked higher as
a security issue for the EU both in France and in the EU as a whole, this did not apply to
the national issue salience of terrorism. In France, there was a considerable increase, but in
the EU as a whole, it remained virtually unchanged.
November 2015 Paris attacks
The results41 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the November 2015
Paris attacks that killed 137 people are displayed in Figure 3. For both the national and EU
salience, similar results are observed for the country of attack and the EU average.
Regarding the national issue salience of terrorism (Q3A), the results within the country
of the attack and the EU average are, respectively, +5 percent and +4 percent. Concerning
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Figure 3. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the November 2015 Paris attacks.
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EU salience (Q5A), an increase of 8 percent is seen for both the country of attack and the
EU average. In this case, convergence can be seen.
Brussels attacks
The results42 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2016 Brussels
attacks that killed thirty-two people are displayed in Figure 4. Here, a strong divergence is
observed for the results of the country of attack and the EU average on national issue
salience (Q3A). For Belgium, there was a large increase from 9 percent to 33 percent who
mentioned terrorism as one of the two most important issues for Belgium. This 33 percent
corresponded to terrorism being the most often mentioned security issue in Belgium. For
the EU average on national salience, terrorism only increased from 11 percent to 16
percent. For the EU issue salience (Q5A), a large increase was seen in Belgium (from 25
percent to 35 percent) but an even larger increase was seen in the EU average (25 percent
to 39 percent). In this case, strong divergence is seen on national issue salience but more
convergence is seen on EU issue salience, although Belgium witnessed a somewhat smaller
increase as compared to the EU average.
Nice attack
The results43 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2016 Nice attack
that killed eighty-six people are displayed in Figure 5. The results for national issue
salience (Q3A) almost remained unchanged in both the country of attack (+1 percent)
and the EU average (−2 percent). A decrease was seen for EU issue salience (Q5A) both in
the country of attack (−4 percent) and a larger one for the EU average (−7 percent). In this
case, convergence is seen on both national and EU issue salience. Interestingly, in France,
the national issue salience still increased (although very marginally) whereas the EU issue
salience in France decreased.
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Figure 4. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Brussels attacks.
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Berlin attack
The results44 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2016 Berlin
attack that killed twelve people are displayed in Figure 6. The results for national
issue salience (Q3A) show an interesting diﬀerence between the country of attack
and the EU average. In Germany, the national issue salience decreased by 1 percent,
whereas the EU average increased considerably from 14 percent to 19 percent. In
Germany, the EU issue salience (Q5A) increased with 3 percent and the EU average
increased very strongly from 32 percent to 44 percent. Thus, interestingly, in
Germany, national issue salience of terrorism decreased (although very marginally)
in the ﬁrst EB after the attack while EU issue salience increased. The EU average
increased more strongly on both the national issue salience and the EU issue
salience; thus, divergence rather than convergence is observed.
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Figure 5. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Nice attack.
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Figure 6. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Berlin attack.
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Westminster attack
The results45 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2017 Westminster
attack that killed ﬁve people are displayed in Figure 7. The results for national issue
salience (Q3A) show a very large increase in national issue salience. It more than doubled
from 15 percent to 33 percent in the UK, whereas the EU average only increased by 5
percent (14–19 percent). Regarding EU issue salience (Q5A), the country of attack as well
as the EU average showed a large increase of, respectively, 11 percent and 12 percent,
adding up to 37 percent and 44 percent. The interviews of the EB after the attack (May
20–28) were partially held after the Manchester attack (May 22) and might therefore also
reﬂect the post-Manchester attack result in addition to the post-Westminster attack result.
Stockholm attack
The results46 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2017 Stockholm
attack that killed ﬁve people are displayed in Figure 8. The results for national issue
salience (Q3A) show that it increased from a very low 3 percent to 6 percent in Sweden.
The EU average increased from 14 percent to 19 percent during the same period.
Regarding EU issue salience (Q5A), Sweden already showed a much higher ﬁgure com-
pared to national issue salience before the attacks (20 percent), which increased to 27
percent after the Stockholm attack. The EU average increased even more sharply during
the period (from 32 percent to 44 percent). This shows convergence on national issue
salience and EU issue salience but with diﬀerent intensity.
Manchester and London Bridge attacks
The results47 of the salience of terrorism in the EB’s before and after the 2017 Manchester
attack and London Bridge attacks are displayed in Figure 9. This graph combines the two
attacks as they both occurred in the same period relative to the publication of the
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Figure 7. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Westminster attack.
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Eurobarometers. On May 22, 2017, twenty-two people were killed during the Manchester
attack on June 3, 2017, eight people were killed during an attack in the London Bridge and
Borough Market area. The results for national issue salience (Q3A) display a diﬀerence
between the country of attack and the EU average. In the UK, the national issue salience
decreased considerably with 8 percent, whereas the EU average decreased slightly less:
from 19 percent to 16 percent. Regarding the EU issue salience (Q5A), both for the
country of attack as well as for the EU average, a considerable decrease was seen (−6
percent). On all metrics, issue salience of terrorism decreased in the period after the
Manchester and London Bridge attacks. It must be noted that this result might have been
caused by the fact that the survey dates of the “pre-attack” EB (20–28 May) were in fact
mostly after the Manchester attack (22 May) and thus eﬀectively showed the “post-attack”
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Figure 9. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Manchester and London Bridge
attack.
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Figure 8. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the the Stockholm attack.
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result. The results of this graph are therefore excluded from being analyzed for the overall
conclusion of this paper.
Barcelona attack
The results48 of the salience of terrorism in the EBs before and after the 2017 Barcelona
attack that killed sixteen people are displayed in Figure 10. The results for national issue
salience (Q3A) display an interesting diﬀerence between the country of attack and the EU
average. In Spain, the national issue salience increased slightly with 2 percent, whereas the
EU average decreased slightly with 3 percent. Regarding the EU issue salience (Q5A), both
for the country of attack and for the EU average, a considerable decrease was seen (−8
percent and −6 percent). This shows divergence on national issue salience and convergence
on EU issue salience.
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Figure 10. National and EU salience of terrorism before and after the Barcelona attack.
Table 1. Increase or decrease of issue salience.
Direction of national issue salience of terrorism
after terrorist attack (1)
Direction of EU issue salience of terrorism
after terrorist attack (2)
Terrorist attacks Country of attack EU average Country of attack EU average
Charlie Hebdo attacks ↑↑ - ↑↑ ↑↑
Paris attacks ↑ ↑ ↑↑ ↑↑
Brussels attacks ↑↑↑ ↑ ↑↑ ↑↑↑
Nice attack - ↓ ↓ ↓↓
Berlin attack - ↑ ↑ ↑↑↑
Westminster attack ↑↑↑ ↑ ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑
Stockholm attack ↑ ↑ ↑↑ ↑↑↑
Barcelona attack ↑ ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓
This table is based on the data of the diﬀerent EB graphs that were presented above with the exception of the Manchester/
London Bridge attacks.
Legend: ─: ≤1 percent increase or decrease; ↑&↓: >1 ≥ 5 percent increase or decrease; ↑↑&↓↓: >5 ≥ 10 percent increase or
decrease; ↑↑↑&↓↓↓: >10 percent increase or decrease.
14 J. DE ROY VAN ZUIJDEWIJN AND J. SCIARONE
Overall results
We combined the results of the diﬀerent graphs and visualized it in order to see any
patterns emerging. Table 1 on the previous page shows the direction of the change in issue
salience of terrorism before and after an attack for both the national salience (1) how
terrorism was seen as an important issue to the particular countries and the EU salience
(2) how terrorism was seen as an important issue to the EU. It is split in the results of the
country where the terrorist attack occurred and the EU average to see if they converge or
diverge both in terms of the direction and the magnitude of the change.
This table shows that substantial diﬀerences exist between national and EU issue
salience. In terms of EU issue salience, a convergence of the salience of terrorism can be
observed in most cases. The direction of issue salience in the country of attack and the EU
average is similar in each of the eight cases. The magnitude of the change diﬀers in four of
the eight cases, with only the Berlin attack being a case where this diﬀerence was
considerable (more than 5 percent). In terms of national issue salience, less convergence
or even divergence can be seen. Only in half of the cases (four) we observe the same
direction of the change in issue salience, with two cases—the November 2015 Paris attacks
and the April 2016 Stockholm attack—where we also see the same magnitude of change.
In the other four cases, the direction of the change was not the same. The data shows that
national issue salience diﬀers per country: there is no convergence, but rather divergence.
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to investigate to what extent we can observe divergence or
convergence in the salience of terrorism after terrorist attacks in the country of attack
compared to the EU average. The results presented above indicate the existence of
diﬀerent mechanisms and patterns. First of all, we observe strong convergence on issue
salience when citizens are asked about the most important security issues to the EU as a
whole. Secondly, divergence is observed regarding the national salience of terrorism. This
could be called a paradoxical situation in terms of the transnationality of issue salience:
citizens within a country of a terrorist attack experience the same changes in their
perception of terrorism as an important security issue to the EU when compared to the
EU average, but diﬀerent developments are seen when they are asked about the impor-
tance of terrorism to their own country.
These diﬀerences could be explained by the fact that many factors can aﬀect the salience of
terrorism and that it is not year clear which factor, under what circumstances, has what kind of
eﬀect on the “total issue salience of terrorism;” the issue salience that we ﬁnd in the
Eurobarometer survey. For instance, the concept of transnationality could explain why citizens
draw similar conclusions for the importance of terrorism to the EU as a whole. A lack of
transnationalism, on the other hand, could explain why this convergence is not seen on the
national salience of terrorism: in the end, citizens still draw diﬀerent conclusions for their own
country and do perceive terrorist attacks, to some extent, as geographically contained events.
Profuse media coverage of attacks, something that is present for all major jihadist
attacks, does not seem to be the most important factor aﬀecting the salience of terrorism
for citizens, as we would have then seen stronger increases in salience on all levels.
Similarly, the casualty numbers also do not seem to be an important explanatory factor
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as the sharpest increases in the EU average of EU issue salience occurred often after
relatively small-scale attacks in terms of the victim numbers (Berlin, Stockholm) and
conversely, decreases occurred after relatively lethal attacks (Nice, Barcelona). The fact
that we still see some convergence on the national level, however, indicates that feelings of
shared identity or a transnational perception of the threat are, to some extent, likely to be
present. Despite the fact that profuse media attention might not be the most important
factor aﬀecting the salience, questions could still be raised about the link between the type
of media coverage and issue salience. This was also suggested by Parker et al. when they
explained that the media does not always focus strongly on terrorist messaging, limiting
the potential eﬀects on issue salience.49 Detailed studies in the type of media coverage and
issue salience could shed more light on this.
Another set of observations relates to the actual direction of change in issue salience.
Interestingly, in some cases, the national salience of terrorism did not increase after a
terrorist attack in that particular country. This should point us toward the limits of the
impact of terrorist attacks. On the contrary, it might also be understood as showing the
resilience of countries and populations to cope with such shocking events and bounce
back from them. Terrorist attacks do not seem to automatically lead to an increase in issue
salience. Despite the fact that the issue salience only reﬂects the relative importance of
terrorism to citizens as compared to other security issues, it does show that terrorist
attacks do not always “overpower” or “crowd out” other security issues for citizens. Only
in March 2016 did terrorism enter the top four of national security concerns, although
unemployment, immigration and the economy continued to rank higher.50 A similar sign
of caution to recognize the limits of the eﬀects of terrorist attacks can be found in the fact
that the importance of terrorism as a security issue to the EU as a whole (temporarily)
declined even at times when terrorist attacks were still occurring (between May 2016–
November 2016 as well as May 2017–November 2017). Again, this could also be inter-
preted as a sign of resilience and it shows that terrorist attacks are not always successful
tools to aﬀect the importance citizens award to terrorism. As terrorism is understood to be
a violent communication strategy, this raises questions about the eﬀectiveness of terrorist
attacks in aﬀecting public opinion. It could also indicate that we need to focus more on
studying the response to terrorist attacks, including concepts such as framing and mean-
ing-making, to understand the salience of terrorism to citizens.
Ultimately, this study shows that the answer to convergence or divergence of issue salience
of terrorism after attacks is that it can be observed on the EU-level, but not on the national
level. Our ﬁndings partially conﬁrm those of Bakker who stated that “there is no European
threat perception” when looking at the national salience of terrorism.51 However, this paper
has argued why it is necessary to complement this by studying how citizens rank terrorism as a
security issue to the EU. There we observe the opposite, as there is strong convergence in
changes in salience when comparing the country of attack with the EU average in the period
2015–2017. In addition to the studied attacks, further proof can be found in the relative
ranking of terrorism for the EU compared to other security issues. Terrorism was not just on
average ranked high as a security threat to the EU, but citizens in almost all member states
ranked terrorism among the top three issues in the studied period. A little variation could be
seen between the individual member states. These are further indications of convergence of
issue salience of terrorism on the European level.
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As this study only takes the ﬁrst exploratory steps to investigate the eﬀects of terrorist
attacks, more research is needed to look into a causal link between the attacks and issue
salience. Further research could take up this challenge to empirically and statistically test
these ﬁrst observations. Particular attention should also be paid to trying to discover the
diﬀerent factors that aﬀect issue salience and how they might change under diﬀerent
circumstances and in relation to other security threats.
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